

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10
ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02
PA-01 DOE-15 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 ICA-11 /159 W
-----095937 282001Z /72

P 281846Z APR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9017
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 06492

E.O.11652:GDS
TAGS: PARM UR US
SUBJECT: US-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND
SEVEN: SUMMARY OF MAJOR ISSUES

REF: GENEVA 2410 (CW MESSAGE NO.30)

CW MESSAGE NO.50

1. THIS TELEGRAM SUMMARIZES THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES WHICH SEEM TO BE MOST IMPORTANT AT THE END OF ROUND SEVEN. SINCE THE LAST SUMMARY OF ISSUES (REFTEL), SEVERAL ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN PRINCIPLE. NO NEW ISSUES HAVE EMERGED. SEPTELS PROVIDE A SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECOND HALF OF ROUND SEVEN AND LIST DETAILED BACK-STOPPING ITEMS.

2. RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL AND HOST STATE DURING CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE US HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT SUCH RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS SHOULD
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BE SPECIFIED IN THE CONVENTION AND HAS PRESENTED SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THERE HAS YET BEEN NO SOVIET REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE US MAINTAIN ITS CURRENT POSITION.

3. DECLARATION OF STOCKS AND FACILITIES.
(A) GENERAL DECLARATION OF STOCKS PRIOR TO ENTRY

INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. THE US POSITION IS THAT SUCH A DECLARATION WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE. THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID IN A DELPHIC MANNER THAT THE QUESTION "COULD BE EXAMINED SUBSEQUENTLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION "OF THE CONVENTION." SO FAR, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT THIS STATEMENT MEANS. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE US MAINTAIN ITS CURRENT POSITION.

(B) DECLARATION OF FACILITIES. THE US HAS PROPOSED THAT FACILITIES WHICH HAVE PRODUCED THE MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE BE DECLARED. THE SOVIETS STRONGLY OPPOSE THIS POSITION AND ADVOCATE INSTEAD THE DECLARATION OF "CAPABILITIES". WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN AN EXPLANATION OF EXACTLY WHAT THE SOVIETS MEAN BY THIS TERM AND WHAT WOULD BE INCLUDED IN SUCH A DECLARATION. FROM SOVIET STATEMENTS, HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ISSUE IS A VERY SENSITIVE ONE.

4. DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES. THE US POSITION IS THAT THE DECLARED FACILITIES SHOULD BE DESTROYED. THE SOVIETS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD PERMIT CONVERSION TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE US POSITION BE REVIEWED TO SEE IF IT CAN BE MODIFIED TO IMPROVE NEGOTIABILITY WHILE MAINTAINING ADEQUATE VERIFIABILITY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF OUR MAJOR ALLIES AS WELL.

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5. REQUIRED INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS AND DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES. THE US HAS EMPHASIZED THAT IT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO REQUIRED ON-SITE VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS AND THE DISPOSITION OF DECLARED CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT VERIFICATION BY THEIR PROPOSED INTERNAL CONTROL ORGANIZATION, TOGETHER WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION, WOULD SUFFICE.

-- WE CONTINUE TO HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT FACILITIES VERIFICATION POSES MUCH MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS THAN DOES VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS. THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY AVOIDED TALKING ABOUT FACILITIES VERIFICATION AT ALL. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE US POSITION BE REVIEWED TO SEE IF IT CAN BE MODIFIED TO IMPROVE NEGOTIABILITY WHILE STILL GIVING THE US ACCESS TO THE FACILITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS RECENTLY DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE STUDYING THE US SUGGESTION THAT DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS COULD BE CONDUCTED AT SPECIALIZED FACILITIES (SO THAT ON-SITE INSPECTION COULD BE CONDUCTED WITH A MINIMUM OF INTRUSION.)

INFORMALLY, MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAVE
INTIMATED THAT WHEN THE STUDY IS FINISHED A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION MAY BE POSSIBLE. WE RECOMMEND THE
BASIC US POSITION ON VERIFICATION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
BE MAINTAINED.

6. OVERALL, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ISSUES RELATED TO
FACILITIES (PARAS 3 B, 4 AND 5 ABOVE) AND THE ISSUE OF
REQUIRED ON-SITE INSPECTION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
(PARA 5 ABOVE) WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE WITHOUT
DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE US AND USSR AT A HIGH LEVEL.
WE RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO RAISING THESE

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 06492

ISSUEES AT A SENIOR POLITICAL LEVEL IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.
VANDEN HEUVEL

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